The first book of Stanley Cavell's that I read is the only book that I ardently wished I had written, The Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Why this book, and not some high impact, world-historical book like Heidegger's Being and Time or Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations? Well, there are a number of reasons, some of them personal and some of them, well, Cavellian. Most immediately, the book explained to me why I so much enjoyed watching again and again over the course of more than three decades the films which are the objects of Cavell's interpretationswhy, in short, watching these films made me so happy, why they filled me with goofy delight, always bringing a smile to my face, a smile not unlike that smile of Cary Grant's (from Holiday) reproduced in the pages of The Pursuits of Happiness.
one must also seek out, treat as a matter of one's own self-intelligibility, thus placing oneself as a philosopher uncomfortably on moral terrain, even if it is not moral in the conventional sense. Thus, engaging with Cavell is inevitably to be prompted to engage with the question of what one thinks one is doing when one is doing philosophy, and whether in doing it one is really comfortable in one's own skin -or, put in a more typically Cavellian way, whether one is doing philosophy in a way that the doing of it makes manifest that one's own voice is at stake, and the matter of one's voice is not independent of the matter of one's chosen philosophical problematic. This the moral terrain which Cavell's writing negotiates, the moral terrain on which one is placed (or displaced) through one's philosophical encounter with that (kind of) writing. Put bluntly, the matter of my voice must matter to any candidate conception of philosophy if philosophy is to be an activity that facilitates the "education of grown-ups" -if philosophy can itself ever "grow-up." And if it is to matter at all, it will matter only if I take it on, if the matter of philosophising is not separated from the matter of my voice. In other words, if philosophy is to have any chance of "growing up," and quite often it doesn't look at all like the chances are remotely good, we will have to turn the question of what philosophy's proper business should be into a matter of its selfeducation, and its self-education a matter of ours.
My first encounter with Cavell was fortuitously at the time I started teaching philosophy, at the moment of full professionalization. As anyone who works or has worked in a department of philosophy will know, the profoundly political but philosophically vacuous distinction between "analytic" and "continental" philosophy can suck out one's soul, like the dreaded Dementors of Harry Potter's school world.
Through the gift of self-intelligibility, the gift that keeps on giving, Cavell became an exemplar of how one can steer clear of the pressure to identify with one or another of these philosophical ideologies, seeking out instead alternative identifications in philosophy's past and in its possible future. It was just at this point that "romanticism," what I began to call "philosophical romanticism," 2 offered liberation from the fallacious dichotomisation of philosophy into analytic and continental, as if these two options exhausted the logical space of philosophical possibility.
Romanticism was not new to me; my interest in it was long-standing, preceding my career in philosophy, going back to a prior career in music. But Cavell's approach to romanticism was different from those with which I was already familiar,
especially from contemporaries such as Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty who identified romanticism as a particularly important influence, even if they didn't quite identify with romanticism. Cavell's romanticism didn't feel dated or over-ripe, nor deflated and domesticated; it was a romanticism that grew on the soil of the New World, the soil prepared by Thoreau and Emerson, and it was still fresh, still alive with possibilities, which I was keen to explore and realise. Moreover, Cavell's willingness to stake his own philosophical identity in going "romantic," so to speak, gave me courage to do the same. My impression is that this going romantic was not so much an explicit philosophical decision as it was an exercise of full sensibility; that going romantic is the exercise of full sensibility -an exercise not without its own particular risks and challenges. that people can, and, improbably, do change, and, indeed, under conditions that would seem to be the most adverse conditions under which to change -such as when they have they lost their way, when their connection to others, to what most matters to them, breaks down, when they become unintelligible to themselves, rendering them incapable of going on as before, not knowing how to go on, either as whom, or with whom. What is more, the improbable change they undergo is shown to be complexly pleasurable, not just hard, bloody painful work on oneself. Complexly pleasurable, because the pleasure in question is composed of both pain and pleasure, the pain of change and its attendant joy. The change the characters undergo is a change they pleasurably let happen, knowing full well that they are thereby making themselves vulnerable to both pain and embarrassment, if not shame and regret as well, a change they are capable of pre-reflectively affirming even if they are not yet ready reflectively to justify the reasons for the change they are letting themselves undergo. No one in the comedies of re-marriage better exemplifies this kind of change than Cary Grant's character in Bringing Up Baby, Dr. David Huxley aka David Bone aka Jerry the Nipper, who, whenever he is around the character portrayed by Katherine Hepburn, society heiress, Susan Vance, finds himself behaving in ways that are completely unintelligible to himself and to those around him. But the truth is that at the point when David meets Susan he is someone who has already lost his way, but Susan, playing the role of the Emersonian or Cavellian friend manifests both David's lostness to himself, and "another way" through which to recover his selfintelligibility. At a decisive moment in the film, David says to Susan: "Now it isn't that I don't like you, Susan, because, after all, in moments of quiet, I'm strangely drawn toward you, but -well, there haven't been any quiet moments." Which is another way for David to say, I'm having the time of my life, but I'm deeply confused about why this is so, since at the very same time my life as I have known it is unravelling at a frightening speed in the most inexplicable way. Change is not very often as complexly pleasurable as it so obviously is for David Huxley through his various adventures with Susan Vance; but it is a question why our typical attitude towards such change is that it must be joyless, unromantic, a painful burden -How did being romantic become so closely identified with being unrealistic, such that change of this kind comes to be seen as too demanding, too risky, to threatening?! This question is as impertinent as it is unavoidable, and yet for all the force of its impertinent insight it is a question that poses the matter of change one-sidedly, twice over. Cavell is right to ask why it is that there is a standing preference for the perpet-
ual pain of a life that remains unturned to the "apparent" pain of turning. However, is it not also the case that a life that remains unturned requires (and does not merely just suggest) violence to remain a life that is not for turning? How else can one lead a life without bearing the demands of moral perfectionism, with its morally distinctive "emphasis before all on becoming intelligible to oneself." 5 The only thing that can justify such an emphasis is the understandably elusive knowledge that a standing "threat to one's moral coherence comes most insistently from that quarter, from one's sense of obscurity to oneself, as if we are subject to demands we cannot formulate, leaving us unjustified, as if our lives condemn themselves." 6 Becoming unresponsive to that threat surely must involve a violence of refusal, and of avoidance, so it is then just as important to ask not only why we are attached to lives not responsive to the demands of moral perfectionism, but also to notice the violence that we must endure at our own hand, so to speak, in order to refuse, and to avoid, those demands -to deny they make any claims on us, for after all those demands do not arise from a philosophical doctrine but from human as well as non-human others with whom we share a form of life.! Now as I have indicated above there is another reason to be wary of Cavell's one-sided framing of the task of change as suggesting violence, and that is provided in many of the splendid films that produce his stunning insights in The Pursuits of Happiness. Change can be hard, yes, threatening, yes, demanding, yes, but change can also involve pleasure, too; complex pleasure intermingled with pain, to be sure, but pleasure nonetheless, lots of it, suggesting something very different from violent change. From which it follows that the work of change has to be conceived differently, in richer and more capacious terms, suggesting, promising, the pursuit of happiness, let's say, something like a utopia, a place where we can be at home in the world, where the world is what we come home to when we are at home. ! ! [W] hat is it about our work, and our ideas of work, that keeps the things we most want to happen from happening… Is there a way alternative to the romantic to ask the question? If you do not produce such an alternative; and if nevertheless you desire to keep hold of the question; then you will have not than Emerson and Thoreau? Cavell certainly did not make it easy for himself. In order to become responsive to two thinkers who in Cavell's time had become so "untimely," in Nietzsche's sense, as to be almost beyond the reach of our hearing, he had to set aside, and leave behind, the much more respectable modernist problematics that were the preoccupation of a number of the essays in Must We Mean What We Say? Who, today, would be responsive to the words of Emerson and Thoreau as words that philosophers are obliged to hear -to hear in their terms not ours, to hear as writers and philosophers -had Cavell had not made us aware of their "mode of If we now see that the New World is not new, and that "America" does not exist, does that mean that a "new world" is out of our reach, that the future is closed to us? How is philosophy to respond to this? From where does it respond? Does it, can it, draw its response only from itself? Which self? What would philosophy have to become to be responsive to circumstances in which futurity itself is at stake (and not just its own)?
Cavell has always been a philosopher who did not shy away from metaphilosophical reflections about what it is philosophy is or should be. But only with his turn to romanticism could he speak of philosophy's task in these terms -the romantic redemption of the very possibility of the human: ! ! Philosophy's peculiar task now -that which will not be taken up if philosophy does not take it up -is, beyond or before that, to prepare us, one by one, for the business of justice; and to train itself for the task of preparation by 
